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Abstract
We analyze how the possibility of resale a¤ects e¢ ciency in multi-object uniform-price
auctions with asymmetric bidders using a combination of theory and experiments. The
resale market is modeled as an unstructured bargaining game between auction bidders. Our
experimental design consists of four treatments that vary the (exogenous) probability that
bidders participate in a resale market after the auction. In all treatments, the possibility of
resale increases e¢ ciency after the auction, but it also induces demand reduction by high-
value bidders during the auction, which reduces auction e¢ ciency. In contrast to what is
usually argued, resale does not necessarily increase nal e¢ ciency. When there is a low
probability of a resale market, nal e¢ ciency is actually lower than in an auction without
resale.
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1. Introduction
Understanding the impact of post-auction resale markets is a crucial issue for market design-
ers. Auctions are frequently followed by the possibility of resale by winning bidders, which
may dramatically alter the outcome from what would have been observed without resale. U.S.
Treasury Bills, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program to sell CO2 allowances,
and spectrum auctions all constitute important auction markets with active resale. From an
e¢ ciency perspective, resale markets are generally viewed positively because they o¤er a second
chance for bidders with higher values to purchase items that they were unable to obtain in the
auction.
The presence of a resale market, however, does not ensure that a losing bidder will necessarily
be able to acquire an object after the auction, even if he has a higher valuation than the auction
winner, because resale may fail. In fact, there are many reasons why resale may fail: bargaining
disagreement, asymmetric information and transactions costs are a few probable causes of resale
failure. In addition to market frictions, the imposition of new regulatory or legal constraints on
post-auction trade may also impede resale.1
We theoretically and experimentally examine the e¤ects of the presence of a post-auction
resale market  that may fail  on e¢ ciency in multi-object auctions. Resale failure implies
that bidders are unable to trade even if they are willing to do so. Our analysis allows us to
address a number of interesting questions: Do bidders integrate the incentives of resale into
their bidding decisions when faced with a risk of failure in resale? What are the e¤ects of an
uncertain resale market on the sellers revenue and auction e¢ ciency? How does changing the
e¢ ciency of the resale market a¤ect nal (post-resale) e¢ ciency?
It is often argued that resale should always be allowed because it favors a more e¢ cient
allocation of the objects on sale by allowing agents to exploit gains from trade (e.g., Mankiw,
2007; Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore, 1994). Recent theoretical and experimental results, however,
suggest that the possibility of resale after multi-object auctions also a¤ects biddersstrategies in
ways that tend to reduce auction e¢ ciency (Pagnozzi and Saral, 2015). This is because in multi-
object auctions bidders have an incentive to reduce demand  i.e., bid less than their valuations
for marginal units, in order to reduce the auction price for inframarginal units (Wilson, 1979;
Ausubel and Cramton, 1998)  and the presence of a resale market exacerbates this incentive
since it provides bidders with a chance to purchase a unit that they do not acquire in the auction.2
Moreover, bidders with low values have an incentive to speculate by bidding aggressively if they
have a chance to resell the objects acquired, increasing the likelihood of an ine¢ cient auction
allocation.
1For example, resale was explicitly forbidden in the early spectrum auctions conducted by the FCC and in
European countries. More recently, the FCC has relaxed strict restrictions on resale, but imposes penalties for
any quick resale (less than 5 years). See 47 C.F.R. section 1.2111 of the FCC.
2For experimental evidence of demand reduction in auctions without resale see Kagel and Levin (2001, 2005),
List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) and Engelmann and Grimm (2009). For a theoretical analysis of demand reduction
in auctions with resale see Pagnozzi (2009, 2010).
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We consider a simple theoretical model of a uniform-price auction with two identical units
on sale and two asymmetric bidders, one strong and one weak, that may be followed by a
resale market.3 The strong bidder has a higher valuation and demands both units; the weak
bidder has a lower valuation and demands only one unit.4 We assume that there is an exogenous
probability of resale failure and examine how changes in this probability a¤ect bidding behavior,
the auctioneers revenue, and the e¢ ciency of the allocation of the objects on sale. The exogenous
probability of resale failure can be interpreted as a reduced-form representation of the e¢ ciency
(or e¤ectiveness) of the resale market.
Our theoretical analysis demonstrates that a lower probability of resale failure (i.e., a more
e¢ cient resale market) leads more speculation by weak bidders and more demand reduction by
strong bidders. Hence, a more e¢ cient resale market has two contrasting e¤ects on allocative
e¢ ciency: it increases e¢ ciency ex-post, once the auction is terminated, but it also induces a
less e¢ cient allocation of the objects on sale in the auction. Therefore, the net e¤ect of resale
on e¢ ciency is likely to depend on the specic characteristics of the resale market and the
behavioral response of bidders to uncertainty. Similarly, a lower probability of resale failure also
has contrasting e¤ects on revenue: it increases speculative bids of weak bidders, which raises
revenue, but it also makes strong bidders more likely to demand reduce, so the net e¤ect depends
on the observed levels of strategic biddersbehavior.
Our empirical analysis is based on an economic experiment designed to identify how e¢ -
ciency and revenue are impacted by an uncertain resale market and the degree to which the
theoretical bidding predictions match with actual behavior. In our design, bidders participate
in an ascending auction which is (possibly) followed by a realistic resale market where bidders
have a chance to trade the objects acquired through an unstructured bargaining game. The
resale stage allows bidders to make multiple o¤ers and to communicate through computerized
chat.5 Treatments vary the probability that a post-auction resale market will open, which we
interpret as a measure of the uncertainty of resale. In one treatment bidders always participate
in a resale stage in the event that the auction allocation is ine¢ cient; while in another treatment
they are never able to resell. In the third and fourth treatments we vary the commonly known
probability of a resale stage between low (30%) and medium (50%).
We nd strong evidence that the presence of a resale market, even when uncertain, distorts
the auction allocation because of high levels of demand reduction and speculation. Consistent
with the results of Pagnozzi and Saral (2015), we show that the presence of a certain resale
3With asymmetric bidders resale may emerge because of biddersstrategic behavior in the auction  demand
reduction and speculation (Garratt and Tröger, 2006; Pagnozzi, 2010).
4For example, in an auction for geographically di¤erentiated mobile phone licenses, a strong bidder can be
interpreted as an incumbent operator who aims at acquiring a nationwide license, while a weak bidder can be
interpreted as a new and smaller entrant, possibly interested only in a local license, or even as a pure speculator.
5Feltovich and Swierzbinski (2011) use a similar approach with computerized chat in an unstructured bar-
gaining game experiment studying the role of cheap talk. See Roth and Malouf (1979) and Roth and Murnighan
(1982) for earlier examples of experiments with bargaining proposals accompanied by messaging. For a survey
on the role of communication in experiments see Crawford (1998) and for a survey of bargaining experiments see
Roth (1995).
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market signicantly increases weak biddersbids and reduces strong biddersbids compared to
the no resale treatment. With an uncertain resale market, weak bidders continue to bid more
aggressively than in the no resale treatment, but in contrast to theoretical predictions of more
speculation with less uncertainty, the level of speculation is similar across treatments. Strong
bidders, on the other hand, are more sensitive to resale uncertainty. They bid lower whenever
resale is possible, but the degree of demand reduction depends on the probability of resale failure
and the strong bidders value. As the probability of a resale failure increases, strong bidders with
higher values are less likely to allow weak bidders to win, but still more than in the no resale
case. Intuitively, the presence of an uncertain resale market reduces strong biddersstrategic
behavior because of the risk that they may not be able to acquire the objects after the auction.
These bidding behaviors result in higher auction e¢ ciency than in an auction with certain resale,
but lower auction e¢ ciency than in the no resale case.
Once bidders enter into the resale market, disagreement also leads to some (endogenous)
failure to trade, but the rate of failure (20%) is approximately the same across all treatments.
So di¤erences in resale market e¢ ciency are driven by di¤erences in the exogenous rate of failure.
This suggests that large e¢ ciency distortions caused by the presence of a resale market can be
corrected through resale, but only when the resale market is relatively e¢ cient. More generally,
changes in the e¢ ciency of the resale market have a non-monotonic e¤ect on nal e¢ ciency,
and auctions followed by a highly uncertain resale market may actually perform worse than a
randomly determined allocation.
Given the observed bidding behavior, we also nd that resale reduces the sellers revenue,
but only when there is a low probability of resale failure. However, allowing resale may increase
revenue when strong bidders do not reduce demand, since weak bidders bid more aggressively
with resale, thereby increasing the auction price.
Our experimental design also generates both quantitative and qualitative (chat) data on
bargaining in the resale stage. Taking advantage of this additional data, we are able to explore
the causes of endogenous failure and more generally investigate common behaviors observed in
resale markets. We nd that initial disagreement is more likely to lead to nal disagreement
(and endogenously failed resale) in less uncertain resale markets. We also nd that the auction
price is an important focal point in more uncertain resale markets. Turning to the qualitative
analysis, statements of o¤ers and value dominate the bargaining conversation (> 39% of all
chat), and value statements are frequently dishonest (54% of all value statements are false).
Strong bidders are much more likely to falsely state their values than weak bidders.
Our paper contributes to the general mechanism design and experiments literature (see,
e.g., Chen and Ledyard, 2008) and more specically to the growing experimental literature on
auctions with resale.6 Experiments on single-object auctions with resale include Georganas
(2011), Georganas and Kagel (2011), Lange et al. (2011), Saral (2012), and Chintamani and
Kosmopoulou (2015). In these papers resale takes place either automatically, through another
6See Kagel and Levin (2011) for a survey of the experimental literature on auctions.
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auction, or through a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er by the auction winner. Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2012)
and Pagnozzi and Saral (2015) analyze multi-object auctions with resale, when a resale market
always exists, and consider the e¤ects of di¤erent structures of the resale market on di¤erent
auction formats. We extend this literature by analyzing the e¤ects of a possible but uncertain
resale market on the auction outcome.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical analysis of
the model that we refer to for our experimental design, and its predictions in terms of bidding
strategies, e¢ ciency, and the auctioneers revenue. Section 3 discusses the design of our ex-
periments, and Section 4 presents the experimental results. Specically, Section 4.1 presents a
summary of the experimental results, Sections 4.2 and 4.3 analyze bidding behavior by weak
and strong bidders respectively, and Sections 4.4 and 4.5 discuss the resale market, e¢ ciency
and revenue. Finally, Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains instructions and screenshots
from our experiments.
2. Theoretical Predictions
Model We consider the simplest model that allows us to experimentally investigate the e¤ects
of the possible, but uncertain, presence of a resale market on bidding strategies and auction
outcomes. Our theoretical analysis builds on the model in Pagnozzi and Saral (2015), who
consider an auction that is always followed by a resale market.
Auction. There is a (sealed-bid) uniform-price auction for 2 units of an identical good, with
no reserve price (we discuss the e¤ect of a positive reserve price in footnote 11). Each player
submits 2 non-negative bids, one for each unit; the 2 highest bids are awarded the units, and
the winner(s) pay a price equal to the 3rd-highest bid for each unit won. We consider a uniform-
price auction because it is the auction mechanism in which the incentive to reduce demand arises
more clearly and because it is widely used to allocate multiple objects. The qualitative results of
the analysis, however, also hold for any mechanism designed to allocate multiple units in which
players face a trade-o¤ between winning more units and paying lower prices. The auction may
be followed by a resale market.
Bidders and Valuations. There are 2 risk-neutral asymmetric bidders. Bidders di¤er both in
the number of units that they demand, and in their valuations for those units. Specically,
bidder S, the strong bidder, demands 2 units and has valuation vS  U [30; 50] for each unit
on sale (i.e., he has at demand); bidder W , the weak bidder, demands 1 unit only and has
valuation vW  U [10; 30] for that unit. Bidders are privately informed about their (independent)
valuations. Hence, bidder S always has a higher valuation than bidder W , and bidders know
the ex-post e¢ cient allocation of the units on sale before the auction. For simplicity, we also
assume that bidder W cannot win more than 1 unit in the auction, even if resale is allowed.7
7We chose to restrict bidder W to single-unit demand to create a simple experimental environment where
subject confusion is unlikely, thus eliminating potential confounding e¤ects. This also facilitates the comparison
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Our assumption on biddersvaluations ensures that in our experiments bidders know the
role they will have in the resale market when they bid in the auction  i.e., whether they will
have a chance to buy or sell in the resale market  allowing us to focus on the di¤erent bidding
strategies of the two types of bidders and on how these strategies are a¤ected by the possibility
of resale. The assumption also implies that bidders know there are gains from trade in the resale
market if W wins a unit.
Resale Market. If bidder W wins a unit in the auction and there is a resale market, he has a
chance to resell the unit to bidder S. A resale market exists with probability q. This probability
may be interpreted as a reduced-form measure of trading frictions or of the e¢ ciency of the resale
market. More literally, (1  q) may be interpreted as the exogenous probability that bidders will
not be allowed to trade after the auction even if they are willing to do so (e.g., because of legal
or regulatory restrictions). Hence, q = 0 indicates an auction without resale and q = 1 indicates
an auction that is always followed by a resale market.
Following Pagnozzi and Saral (2015), we consider resale through a general bargaining pro-
cedure between bidders. We believe that this is a more realistic representation of many real-life
situations in which bidders attempt to trade after an auction but do not follow a formal trading
mechanism (e.g., because no bidder has the bargaining power to impose his preferred trading
mechanism).8
The actual gains from trade in the resale market are vS   vW , since Ws outside option
when he trades in the resale market is equal to his valuation, while Ss outside option is zero.
We assume that bargaining in the resale market results in S obtaining a share  of the gains
from trade and W obtaining a share (1  ) of the gains from trade. This bargaining outcome
follows from bidders trading at a resale price (1  ) vS + vW , and it can be interpreted as a
reduced-form representation of the nal outcome of various di¤erent resale mechanisms in which
both bidders expect to obtain some share of the gains from trade in the resale market, in case
resale is possible. Our qualitative results are robust to many alternative models of the resale
market.
Bidding Strategies. There is demand reduction if a bidder bids less than his valuation for a unit,
while there is speculation if a bidder bids more than his valuation for a unit. In a uniform-price
auction without resale, it is a weakly dominant strategy for a bidder to bid his valuation for
the rst unit. When resale may be possible, bidder W may nd it protable to speculate and
bid more than his valuation in the auction, if he expects to have a chance to resell the unit.
between the weak biddersbehavior with and without resale.
Even if bidder W can win 2 units when resale is allowed, it is an equilibrium for both bidders to reduce demand
and bid for 1 unit only, as in our model. The reason is that, as it will become clear from the analysis, bidder S
has an incentive to reduce demand only if he can win one unit in the auction.
8Previous experiments on auctions with resale assume a di¤erent structure for the resale market. Georganas
(2011) use a secondary auction for the resale market; Georganas and Kagel (2011) and Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2012)
utilize take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by the auction winner; Lange et al. (2011) and Saral (2012) assume automatic
transfers to bidders with higher valuations.
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Moreover, bidder S may nd it protable to reduce demand and bid less than his valuation
for the second unit in order to pay a lower price for the rst unit. The logic is the same as
the standard textbook logic for a monopsonist withholding demand: buying an additional unit
increases the price paid for the rst, inframarginal, units.
Because there are 2 units on sale and a total demand for 3 units, the auction outcome only
depends on Ws bid for one unit, and on Ss bid for the second unit. The lower of these two
bids will be the auction price, and either S will win both units at a price equal to Ws bid, or
the two bidders will win one unit each at a price equal to Ss bid.
Equilibrium To characterize equilibrium bidding strategies, suppose that bidder S reduces
demand and bids 0 for the second unit in the auction if vS  v, and bids his valuation vS
otherwise.
By assumption, if bidder W wins a unit in the auction and there is a resale market, he
obtains an actual surplus equal to (1  ) (vS   vW ) in the resale market. Hence, bidder W is
willing to outbid bidder S to win if and only if vS < v. And since the resale market only exists
with probability q, he bids
bW  vW + q (1  ) (E [vS j vS < v]  vW )| {z }
expected resale prot
for a unit on sale in the auction.9 This is the highest price that bidder W is willing to pay for a
unit. Therefore, in an auction without resale (i.e., when q = 0) bidder W bids his valuation for
a unit vW , while if there is a chance of a resale market (i.e., when q > 0) bidder W speculates
because of the option to resell to bidder S and bids higher than his valuation.
Given this strategy, bidder S has a choice between two alternatives. First, bidder S can
outbid bidder W and win 2 units in the auction at an expected price equal to E [bW ], thus
obtaining an expected prot equal to
2 (vS   E [bW ]) : (2.1)
Second, bidder S can reduce demand and bid zero for the second unit in the auction (letting W
win the other unit),10 thus winning one unit at price 0 in the auction and then possibly buying
the second unit from bidder W in resale market. In this case, S obtains an expected total prot
equal to
vs   0| {z }
auction prot
+ q (vS   E [vW ])| {z }
expected resale prot
: (2.2)
9 If W wins a unit in the auction at price p, he obtains an expected prot equal to (1  q) vW +
q [vW + (1  ) (E [vS j vS < v]  vW )]   p; while if W loses the auction, he obtains 0. So he bids a price such
that his expected prot from winning is equal to zero.
10Of course, reducing demand but bidding a strictly positive price is never an optimal strategy.
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Comparing (2.1) and (2.2), when there is the possibility of a resale market bidder S prefers
to reduce demand in the auction rather than outbid bidder W if and only if
(1 + q) vS   qE [vW ] > 2 fvS   E [vW ]  q (1  ) (E [vS j vS < v]  E [vW ])g
, vS < v  40  10q (1 + )
1  q :
Bidder Ss incentive to reduce demand in the auction is lower when he has a relatively high
valuation, because reducing demand and running the risk of not obtaining the second unit is
more costly when that unit is more valuable. When resale is not allowed (q = 0), bidder S
reduces demand if and only if vS < 2E [vW ] = 40. A higher q increases v, thus inducing bidder
S to reduce demand more often, because losing a unit in the auction is less costly when there
is a high probability of a resale market.11 In other words, bidder S bids less aggressively in the
auction when he may have an option to buy in the resale market, and his bid is lower the higher
is the probability of having this option.
Bidder S always reduces demand (regardless of his value) if v  50  i.e.,
q > q  10
40  10:
In this case, the probability of a resale market is su¢ ciently high to induce bidder S to always
prefer to win one unit at price 0 in the auction and then attempt to buy the other unit from
bidder W , rather than pay the price necessary to outbid bidder W and win both units in the
auction.12 A higher  reduces bW and hence v, thus inducing bidder S to reduce demand
less often, because outbidding bidder W to win the second unit is less costly when he bids less
aggressively in the auction. With equal sharing of the resale surplus,  = 12 , bidder S always
reduces demand if q > q ' 0:29.
Therefore, when vS < v there is demand reduction and both bidders win one unit each in
the auction at a price equal to 0 (which can also be interpreted as tacit collusion among bidders,
intended to reduce the sellers revenue);13 when vS < v there is no demand reduction, bidder
S wins both units and the auction price is equal to bW .
11Our qualitative results do not hinge on the absence of a reserve price, since bidder S has an incentive to reduce
demand even if he has to pay a strictly positive (but not too high) reserve price. Therefore, as in our model, if q
is su¢ ciently high: bidder W is willing to pay the reserve price and resell to bidder S; bidder S prefers to reduce
demand and win 1 unit at the reserve price, rather than outbid bidder W to win 2 units, if vS is su¢ ciently low.
(The reserve price may be so high that it is unprotable for bidder W to win the auction, but sellers often lack
the information and the commitment power to set high reserve prices.)
12 If bidders are risk averse, the potential prots in the resale market become less attractive, due to the un-
certainty of the resale market. Hence, bidders both speculate less and reduce demand less, thus reducing he
probability that bidder W wins a unit in the auction.
13 If bidders are risk averse, the potential prots in the resale market become less attractive, due to the un-
certainty of the resale market. Hence, bidders both speculate less and reduce demand less, thus reducing he
probability that bidder W wins a unit in the auction.
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Revenue and E¢ ciency Since bidder S has a higher value than bidderW , demand reduction
by bidder S results in an ine¢ cient allocation of the units on sale at the end of the auction,
while the nal allocation is ine¢ cient if bidder S does not win both units in the auction and
there is no resale market.14 Hence, an increase in q has two contrasting e¤ects on nal e¢ ciency:
rst, it reduces auction (interim) e¢ ciency because it increases demand reduction by bidder S;
second, it increases e¢ ciency after the auction since it increases the probability that bidders will
be able to trade in case the auction allocation is ine¢ cient.
When q = 1 the nal allocation is always e¢ cient, regardless of biddersstrategies during
the auction. When q = 0, the nal allocation is e¢ cient with probability 12 (ex ante), since there
is no resale market and half of bidder S types reduce demand. When q = q, the nal allocation
is e¢ cient with probability q < 12 , since bidder S always reduces demand and there is a resale
market with probability q. Hence, a relatively low probability of a resale market may reduce
nal e¢ ciency compared to an auction without resale, depending on biddersbargaining power
in the resale market.
Finally, the sellers revenue is equal to 0 when bidder S reduces demand, and is positive and
increasing in bW when bidder S does not reduce demand. Hence, an increase in q also has two
contrasting e¤ects on the sellers revenue: rst, it tends to reduce revenue because it increases
demand reduction by bidder S; second, it tends to increase revenue because it increases bidder
Ws bid (which represents the auction price when bidder S does not reduce demand).
Therefore, the e¤ects of a change in the probability of a resale market on nal e¢ ciency and
the sellers revenue is ultimately an empirical question.
Summing up, the theoretical predictions of the model that we test using experimental
methodology are the following.
Result 1: Ws Bid. Bidder W bids vW without resale and bids above vW with resale. Bidder
Ws bid is increasing in the probability of a resale market.
Result 2: Ss Bid. Bidder S reduces demand if and only if vS is su¢ ciently low. A higher
probability of a resale market and a lower  make demand reduction by bidder S more likely. If
q is su¢ ciently high, bidder S always reduces demand.
Result 3: E¢ ciency. A higher probability of a resale market reduces auction e¢ ciency. The
e¤ect of a higher probability of a resale market on nal e¢ ciency is ambiguous and depends on
the amount of demand reduction by bidder S.
Result 4: Revenue. The e¤ect of a higher probability of a resale market on the sellers revenue
is ambiguous and depends on the amount of demand reduction by bidder S.
14By assumption, if there is a resale market bidders always trade and, hence, the nal allocation is e¢ cient.
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3. Experimental Design
Our experiment is designed to test how an uncertain resale market impacts bidding behavior
and consequently, auction and nal outcomes. The design consists of four treatments that vary
the probability that a resale market opens at the end of the auction, based on the theoretical
environment described above. Our baseline treatment has no resale market (q = 0), and the
remaining treatments implement positive probabilities of a resale market that vary from a low
probability of resale (q = :3), to medium probability of resale (q = :5), to certain resale (q = 1).
In all treatments, each period began with an ascending clock uniform-price auction for two
items of a hypothetical good.15 Each auction always had 1 strong bidder and 1 weak bidder.
The strong bidder was allowed to purchase up to 2 units of the hypothetical good, and randomly
drew his private valuation for each unit from a uniform distribution on [30; 50]. The weak bidder
could purchase 1 unit only, and randomly drew his private valuation from a uniform distribution
on [10; 30]. A subjects role was randomly assigned at the start of the experiment, and stayed the
same for the duration of the experiment.16 During the auction, bidders were given information
about the distribution of the competitors valuation and the number of units demanded.
The auction used a bid clock that gradually increased from 0 in increments of 1, indicating
the auction price for a unit. To bid in the auction, subjects chose to drop outwhen the clock
reached a price at which they wanted to exit the auction. The auction ended as soon as one
bidder dropped out, and the auction price paid for each unit was equal to the dropout bid. If
neither subject dropped out, the auction ended when the bid clock hit the maximum possible
value of the strong bidder, 50, and the units were awarded by random draw. If both subjects
dropped out simultaneously, ties were again broken randomly. A bidder who won a unit earned
the di¤erence between his value and the price resulting from the auction.
In the no resale treatment, the auction determined the nal outcome. In the uncertain
resale treatments, if the weak bidder won a unit, whether or not a resale market would begin
was determined by a random draw that was displayed to subjects using a computerized spin
wheel with two color-coded pie sections that indicated Resale in the green section and No
Resalein the red section. The size of the sections reected the probability of resale (e.g. 30%
of the pie was green, 70% of the pie was red when q = :3).17 If the spin wheel landed on the
Resalesection, the resale market opened, otherwise the auction determined the nal outcome.
In the certain resale treatment, if the weak bidder won a unit, the resale market always opened.
In the resale stage, participants knew the auction price and individual valuations remained
private.
The resale market, if it did open, was an unstructured bargaining game (as in Pagnozzi
15We use ascending auctions (rather than sealed-bid ones) because they are widely used in the eld and, based
on previous experimental evidence, easier to understand for bidders.
16The strong bidder was referred to as a 2-unit bidder and the weak bidder as a 1-unit bidder to minimize
labeling e¤ects.
17Sample screenshots and instructions for all treatments are available in the appendix.
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and Saral, 2015) between the same auction bidders. Both the weak and strong players could
simultaneously make o¤ers through a computerized o¤er board. Only one posted o¤er per
participant was allowed at a time, but o¤ers could always be changed prior to agreement. Either
role could accept the o¤er made by their counterpart and the resale stage terminated once an
o¤er was accepted. Bidders could also send each other messages and discuss the o¤ers through
anonymous chat.18 There was a time limit of 3 minutes to reach agreement.
In all resale treatments, participants could exit the resale market without trading at any
point of their choosing. If a resale o¤er was agreed upon, the unit was transferred from the weak
bidder (seller) to the strong bidder (buyer). The weak bidder earned the di¤erence between the
resale price and his value, and the strong bidder earned the di¤erence between his value and the
resale price. If resale failed, both bidders earned 0. Any resale earnings were in addition to the
earnings from the auction. The experimental treatments are summarized below.
1. No Resale: After the auction, there is no resale market.
2. 30% Resale: If the weak bidder wins a unit in the auction, bidders participate in a resale
market with 30% probability.
3. 50% Resale: If the weak bidder wins a unit in the auction, bidders participate in a resale
market with 50% probability.
4. 100% Resale: If the weak bidder wins a unit in the auction, bidders participate in a
resale market with certainty.
We conducted 3 sessions for each treatment yielding a total of 12 sessions with 16 participants
in each session. Each session had 30 auction/resale rounds, except when the time constraint
of 2 hours required a reduction in the number of rounds. This happened in all three sessions
of the 100% Resale treatment that had 20 rounds per session, and in one session in the 50%
Resale treatment that had 28 rounds. After each round, subjects were randomly rematched. To
ensure the least amount of changes, we used the same values and probability draws for failed
resale in all sessions. Subjects were students at Florida State University recruited using ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004).
The experiment was programmed using Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Prior to the
beginning of the paid periods, all subjects were given instructions which included examples
of bidding behavior and, when applicable, resale market outcomes. To ensure subjects un-
derstanding, they were required to correctly complete a computerized quiz before continuing.
Payo¤s during the experiment were denominated in experimental currency units, ECUs, which
transformed into US dollars at the rate of $0.01 per ECU. Table 3.1 shows the average earnings
(including the show-up fee) broken down by type and treatment.19
18Previous experiments on auctions with resale have always used automatic resale or take-it-or-leave-it formats
for the resale market (see for example Saral, 2009; Georganas, 2011; Georganas and Kagel, 2011).
19Note that these earnings are cumulative for the entire session and are not directly comparable to reported
average period earnings in the results section because of varying periods between treatments.
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No Resale 30% Resale 50% Resale 100% Resale
Weak Earnings $12:99 $14:46 $15:03 $14:67
Strong Earnings $23:09 $22:82 $23:37 $20:43
Table 3.1: Average earnings.
4. Experimental Results
In this section, we describe the main results of our experiments. We begin with summary
statistics that provide a broad overview of the results in Section 4.1. In the remaining sections
we provide formal tests of the theoretical hypotheses: Sections 4.2 and 4.3 analyze the bidding
behavior of weak and strong bidders, respectively, Sections 4.4 analyzes the resale market and
Section 4.5 analyzes e¢ ciency and revenue.
4.1. Summary Statistics
Table 4.1 presents the average per unit auction price (which is equivalent to half the auction-
eers revenue). The rst column indicates the overall average price, which is decreasing in the
probability of a resale market. Columns 2 and 3 divide the price by whether or not the weak
bidder won a unit or the strong bidder won both. When the weak bidder wins 1 unit, prices are
much lower than when the strong bidder wins both units, although they are above the predicted
price of zero.
Auction Price E¢ ciency
W Wins W Loses Auction Final Random
No Resale 14:62 8:02 18:81 :83 :83 :76
30% Resale 11:24 6:61 20:01 :70 :76 :76
50% Resale 10:09 6:02 18:68 :69 :83 :76
100% Resale 8:47 5:25 17:22 :66 :95 :76
Table 4.1: Average auction prices and e¢ ciency.
The second part of Table 4.1 examines allocative e¢ ciency depending on the probability
of resale. Since the rst unit was always awarded to the strong bidder, changes in e¢ ciency
depend on the allocation of the second unit. We consider two forms of e¢ ciency: auction
e¢ ciency, dened as the ratio between the value of the auction winner and the value of the
strong bidder, and nal e¢ ciency which takes into account transactions in the resale market
and is measured as the ratio between the value of the nal holder of the unit and the value of
the strong bidder.
The highest e¢ ciency in the auction stage was generated by the no resale treatment, indicat-
ing that strong bidders were winning both units most often in this treatment. Auction e¢ ciency
is also decreasing in the probability of resale, as predicted. The low auction e¢ ciency with a
positive probability of resale is even more striking when compared to the random e¢ ciency of
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76% achieved if the auction winner is a randomly selected bidder. This indicates that strong
bidders frequently allow weak bidders to win, even when resale may fail.
In the 100% resale treatment, since bidders always participate in a resale market, nal
e¢ ciency should rise and we do see e¢ ciency reach 95%. However, we do not reach full e¢ ciency
as some trades fail to materialize despite the opportunity. In the uncertain (30% and 50%) resale
treatments, although e¢ ciency rises through resale, the exogenous probability of failure makes
full e¢ ciency impossible. Final e¢ ciency is relatively low: the 50% resale treatment results in
a nal e¢ ciency equivalent to the no resale case, and the 30% resale treatment does no better
than a random allocation. Therefore, changes in the probability of resale have a non-monotonic
e¤ect on nal e¢ ciency.
Table 4.2 provides the relative and absolute frequency of resale and failed resale. Resale was
only possible if the weak bidder won a unit because of demand reduction. The frequency of
demand reduction is increasing in the probability of a resale market, and approximately 73%
of auctions result in the weak bidder winning a unit when resale is certain. Notice that the
theoretical predictions of demand reduction were based on risk neutral bidders, but one should
expect risk averse strong bidders to be less willing to let a weak bidder win when the probability
of failed resale is high, which is consistent with our empirical results.
% Resale Possible Failed Resale
(n) (W Wins) Exogenous Endogenous
No Resale
(720)
38:9
(280)
100
(280)
100
(280)
-
30% Resale
(720)
65:4
(471)
80:7
(380)
74:7
(352)
5:9
(28)
50% Resale
(704)
67:9
(478)
58:4
(279)
47:3
(226)
11:1
(53)
100% Resale
(480)
73:1
(351)
20:5
(72)
- 20:5
(72)
Table 4.2: Relative and absolute frequency of resale and failed resale.
Consider now resale failure when resale was possible. Resale could fail because of the exoge-
nous probability given by the spin wheel, but it could also fail because of disagreement in the
resale market (endogenous failure). The rst column of the second part of Table 4.2 presents
the overall relative frequency of failed resale. The failure rates are predictably decreasing in the
exogenous probability of resale but, surprisingly, we still have high failure rates (20.5%) in the
100% resale treatment. The last two columns break down the failure rate into exogenous and
endogenous rates of failure. Notably, the rate of endogenous failure decreases as resale becomes
more uncertain, but the strength of this e¤ect depends on the reference group that the rate is
calculated from. If the rate of endogenous failure is calculated out of auctions where the resale
market opened (versus out of all auctions where W won a unit, as in the table), the di¤erences
between treatments is smaller. In the 30% Resale treatment, endogenous failure occurs 23.5%
of the time, in the 50% resale treatment, 21.0% of the time, and in the 100% treatment, 20.5%
of the time.
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Table 4.3 presents summary information from the resale market, including the average rst
and last o¤ers made by weak and strong players, and the nal resale price when agreement
took place. Average o¤ers and resale prices were similar across treatments, making it less likely
that the di¤erences in the endogenous failure rates presented in Table 4.2 depended on price.
In Section 4.4, we utilize both quantitative and qualitative analysis to determine what triggers
endogenous resale failure.
First O¤er Last O¤er Resale Price Resale Earnings
W S W S W S
30% Resale 33:54 18:65 28:72 24:58 26:15 6:59 12:44
50% Resale 33:77 19:54 28:45 24:65 26:98 7:26 12:69
100% Resale 33:86 20:61 29:22 25:36 27:45 8:36 12:44
Table 4.3: Average resale o¤ers and price.
The last part of Table 4.3 examines resale market earnings (equal to the di¤erences between
resale price and value for weak bidders, and between value and resale price for strong bidders).
These earnings allow us to identify the surplus split (bargaining power) between types. It is
evident that strong bidders dominated the surplus split in all resale treatments. Moreover,
uncertainty strengthened the bargaining power of strong bidders as their share of the total
resale surplus is approximately 65% in the uncertain resale treatments, and reduces to 60% in
the certain resale treatment.
Finally, Table 4.4 examines total earnings di¤erences across bidders and treatments. Earn-
ings for weak bidders are predicted and observed to be much higher when the weak bidder was
able to resell. Weak earnings are lowest under no resale and increasing in the probability of
resale (even if resale failed) due to lower bids by strong bidders. In the 100% resale treatment,
weak earnings when the weak bidder did not resell are close to the successful resale earnings.
Earnings for strong bidders are highest when the strong bidder purchases the second unit in re-
sale. Similar to weak bidders, total earnings across the resale treatments were relatively similar
when resale was successful.
W Wins W Loses
No/Failed Resale Resale
W S W S W S
No Resale 12:75 29:71     0 44:33
30% Resale 13:23 31:46 22:80 47:68 0 43:68
50% Resale 14:87 32:66 21:69 47:07 0 44:27
100% Resale 19:25 31:67 22:27 47:14 0 46:42
Table 4.4: Total earnings.
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4.2. Weak Type Bidding
Weak bidders are predicted to bid up to their value in the no resale treatment, and to speculate
and increase their bids by the expected resale surplus, which depends on the probability of resale
in the resale treatments. Hence, bids in the no resale treatment should be lower than in all resale
treatments, and bids in the resale treatments should be increasing in the probability of resale.
0
10
20
30
40
50
10 15 20 25 30
No Resale
0
10
20
30
40
50
10 15 20 25 30
30% Resale
0
10
20
30
40
50
10 15 20 25 30
50% Resale
0
10
20
30
40
50
10 15 20 25 30
100% Resale
Bi
d
Unit Value
Figure 4.1: Observed (losing) bids versus unit values for weak bidders across all treatments.
Figure 4.1 provides scatterplots of the observed bids of weak bidders against values. The
gures include a reference line for bids equal to value. In the no resale treatment, many bids
equal value, as predicted. In the remaining treatments, we again see most bids clustered around
value. However, since the graphs only display the observed losing bids, moving from the no
resale to the 100% resale treatment we see a reduction in the number of observations. This
indicates that weak bidders win more often when resale is more certain. In all graphs there are
also bids above value, indicating that speculation does take place.
To formally examine bidding behavior, Table 4.5 reports marginal e¤ects from panel tobit
regressions on bids for weak types. We use a tobit model due to the large number of unobserved
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bids which are censored at the auction price whenever the weak bidder won a unit in the auction.
The no resale treatment serves as the baseline treatment and the variables of interest include
the value of the weak bidder, vw, and treatment dummies. In the second specication we also
include a dummy for losses and the variable Period, which tracks the round of play to test for
learning e¤ects.
Weak Bid (1) (2)
vw 0.662*** 0.662***
(0.0260) (0.0296)
30% Resale (30R) 2.646** 2.606**
(1.174) (1.076)
50% Resale (50R) 3.135* 3.211**
(1.669) (1.476)
100% Resale (100R) 4.284*** 4.121***
(1.254) (1.379)
30Rvw -0.0539 -0.0532
(0.0450) (0.0513)
50Rvw -0.103* -0.109*
(0.0591) (0.0572)
100Rvw -0.155** -0.155**
(0.0665) (0.0682)
Period -0.0234
(0.0172)
Losst 1 -0.443
(1.218)
Observations 2,624 2,624
Bootstraped standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.5: Marginal e¤ects from random e¤ects panel tobit - Weak bidding.
The robust result across models is that bidding behavior is signicantly more aggressive in
the resale treatments than in the no resale treatment, conrming the rst part of theoretical
result 1. The magnitude of the coe¢ cients is increasing in the probability of resale, but tests
between the resale treatment coe¢ cients reveal no signicant di¤erence (p  0:218) in either of
the models, leading to a rejection of the second part of theoretical result 1.
Empirical Result 1: Weak bidders bid more aggressively with resale than without, even when
resale is uncertain.
We also nd a strong negative e¤ect of value in the 100% resale treatment, indicating that
bidders with higher values bid less aggressively when resale is certain. This e¤ect also exists in
the 50% treatment, but is statistically weaker. In model 2 we nd no signicant time e¤ects or
changes in bidding due to losses in the previous round.
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4.3. Strong Type Bidding
Figure 4.2 provides scatterplots of the observed bids of strong bidders against values and includes
a reference line for bids equal to value. In the no resale treatment, we see a larger number of
zero bids for values below 40 than for values above 40. In all other resale treatments, we see a
large number of zero bids, regardless of values.
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Figure 4.2: Observed (losing) bids versus unit values for strong bidders across all treatments.
To formally test for di¤erences in treatments and to account for unobserved bids, Table 4.6
reports marginal e¤ects from panel tobit regressions on bids for strong types. The rst two
specications are run on all observations, while models 3 and 4 restrict the sample based on
strong biddersvalues. We include the strong bidders value, vs, and treatment dummies in all
models. In models 1 and 2, we also include an indicator variable, Ivs>40, for when the strong
bidders value is above 40 to account for predicted theoretical di¤erences in bidding behavior
in the no resale treatment. We test for learning e¤ects by including in models 2 through 4 the
round variable, Period, and in models 3 and 4 the variable Wint 1, that indicates if the bidder
won 2 units in the last round.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strong Bid all vs all vs vs < 40 vs > 40
vs 0.350*** 0.332*** 0.302*** 0.141
(0.0738) (0.0670) (0.0613) (0.0860)
30% Resale (30R) -3.829** -3.073** -2.600** -5.896***
(1.568) (1.345) (1.275) (2.167)
50% Resale (50R) -4.263** -3.354** -2.877** -6.675***
(1.659) (1.449) (1.340) (2.540)
100% Resale (100R) -5.524*** -4.741*** -3.975*** -9.875***
(1.406) (1.400) (1.374) (2.293)
Ivs>40 7.182* 9.633***
(4.044) (3.601)
Ivs>40  vs -0.182* -0.177**
(0.0986) (0.0790)
30RIvs>40 -2.107
(1.332)
50RIvs>40 -2.610*
(1.350)
100RIvs>40 -4.408***
(1.248)
Period -0.192*** -0.171*** -0.202***
(0.0298) (0.0163) (0.0410)
Wint 1 0.913** 2.440***
(0.367) (0.672)
Observations 2,624 2,624 1,438 1,186
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.6: Marginal e¤ects from random e¤ects panel tobit - Strong bidding.
The coe¢ cients on the treatment variables in models 1 and 2 provide strong evidence that
resale reduced bids, even when the probability of resale was low. We also nd a positive signi-
cant coe¢ cient on the indicator variable for high values providing evidence of higher bids when
strong bidders had higher values in the no resale treatment. Treatment interactions with this
variable in model 2 suggest that bidding behavior when resale was more uncertain was closer
to bidding behavior in the no resale treatment. As a robustness check of this result, model 3
restricts the regression to bids by strong bidders with values less than 40, and model 4 to bids
by strong bidders with values greater than 40. Both models demonstrate that, with a positive
probability of resale, strong bids are signicantly lower than in the no resale treatment. For
low values, we nd no signicant di¤erences between the resale treatments (p  0:197), but for
higher values (model 4) we do nd that bids are signicantly lower in the 100% resale treatment
(p = 0:017) than the other resale treatments.20 This supports the predictions of theoretical
20We have run alternative models that restrict the regression to only resale treatments (dropping the no resale
18
result 2.
Empirical Result 2: Strong bidders bid lower with resale than without, even when resale is
uncertain.
Empirical Result 3: Strong bidders with higher values bid higher when resale is more uncertain.
In contrast to weak bidders, who displayed no learning e¤ects, the signicant negative impact
of Period suggests that strong bids decrease over time. The signicant, positive coe¢ cient on
Wint 1 reveals a strong reinforcement learning e¤ect from winning 2 units: strong bidders who
won 2 units in the previous round bid more aggressively in the current round, particularly when
their value is higher.
4.4. Resale Market
The resale market was an unstructured bargaining game where, in addition to the ability to
make alternating o¤ers on a posted-o¤er board, subjects were allowed to freely communicate
in an anonymous e-chat room.21 We take advantage of this additional data and employ mixed
methods, using both qualitative and quantitative approaches to examine resale market behaviors
and outcomes.
To analyze chat in the bargaining game, we identied ve major categories (nodes) of dis-
cussion: Value, Resale Earnings, O¤ers, Instruction, and Other that picked up the remainder of
chat not directly related to the previous categories, but frequent enough to merit coding. The
major categories were developed by grouping the minor categories that more precisely describe
the content of a statement. All categories are listed in Table 4.7.
Two post-graduates independently coded the qualitative data into the identied categories.
Table 4.7 reports the relative frequency of each category out of all bargaining groups.22 The
rst column includes all chat groups across all treatments, and the subsequent columns provide
the relative frequency by treatment. A statement is assigned to a category if both coders agreed
to the categorization. Overall, there was a high level of agreement, which we measure using
Cohens kappa coe¢ cient of inter-rater agreement. The most common communication was a
statement of (non-binding) o¤er, followed closely by statements of value.23
Because statements of value were frequently used, we examine the honesty of subjectsvalue
statements in Figure 4.3 which presents a density histogram of the di¤erence between stated
treatment) as a robustness check of less demand reduction for higher values when resale is more uncertain. In
these specications, we continue to nd evidence that when values are higher, bids are signicantly lower in the
100% treatment than the 30% (p = 0:006) and 50% (p = 0:047) resale treatments.
21Our only restriction on communication was that subjects do not identify themselves. We also asked that they
refrain from the use of profanity.
22Examples of categories: Bargaining - stating that o¤er is too high/low, rejection of standing o¤er; General
instructions - statements about partners, reference to conversion rate earnings; Game implications - reference to
the spinner or other probabilities, 2 unit player claiming to help other person by dropping out early, 2 unit player
makes more.
23O¤ers were only binding when submitted through the posted-o¤er mechanism.
19
Category % of All Chat 30% Resale 50% Resale 100% Resale 
Value
Stating value 39:82 25:45 37:50 45:09 :83
Asking for others value 20:36 18:18 14:29 25:45 :88
Other reference 1:34 0 0:60 2:23 :10
Resale Earnings
Fair earnings 12:30 9:09 10:71 14:29 :69
Losses 17:67 16:36 11:90 22:32 :83
Earnings from o¤er 22:60 21:82 21:43 23:66 :44
Other reference 0:89 0 0 1:79 :50
O¤ers
Final o¤er/threat to exit 10:96 12:73 10:71 10:71 :74
Asking for o¤er 8:05 5:45 3:57 12:05 :74
Statement of o¤er 42:51 34:55 52:98 36:61 :79
Bargaining 30:43 32:73 32:14 28:57 :41
Instruction
General instructions 1:12 0 0:60 1:79 :23
How to bid 1:34 0 1:79 1:34 :47
How to make decisions in resale 1:12 0 0 2:23 :48
Game implications 7:61 3:64 11:31 5:80 :49
Asking questions 1:79 5:45 0:60 1:79 :45
Other
Auction earnings /price 0:22 1:82 0 0 :14
Reference to lying/honesty 2:24 1:82 1:19 3:13 :73
Reference to earlier play 2:46 0 1:79 3:57 :45
Verbal agreement to o¤er 15:88 9:09 19:64 14:73 :73
Reference to time left 2:01 3:64 1:19 2:23 :69
Table 4.7: Percent of chat by category. Kappa coe¢ cient of inter-rater agreement: .01-.20 slight,
.21-.40 fair, .41-.60 moderate, .61-.80 substantial, >.80 almost perfect
values and actual values. We break down the behavior by treatment and type, and include
kernel density plots. Bars at 0 represent accurate statements of value and bars to right (left)
of 0 represent overstatements (understatements) of value. False value statements are made by
both types, but strong types appear to provide false lower values more frequently than weak
types, who appear more honest, particularly in the 50% and 100% treatments.24
Although we showed that resale, even when uncertain, distorts the e¢ ciency of the auction
allocation, resale can correct the allocative distortion if a weak bidder successfully resells to a
strong one. In Table 4.8 we report marginal e¤ects from probit regressions with agreement to a
resale o¤er as the dependent variable, to examine how key variables inuence the probability of
resale. New variables are the di¤erence between the initial o¤ers of the resale participants, the
di¤erence between strong and weak values, the number of o¤ers made by a bargaining pair, and
24The strong histogram in the 100% treatment displays a bin beyond -20 (the di¤erence between the minimum
and maximum strong biddersvalues) because four stated values by strong bidders were lower than 30.
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Figure 4.3: Histogram plots of value statements.
ve chat dummies which indicate whether a group had chat coded in the specied category.
Model 1 is the baseline test for treatment di¤erences for all cases where the weak bidder won
a unit (i.e., resale was possible). As expected, the probability of nal agreement is signicantly
increasing in the exogenous probability of resale (coe¢ cient test between 50% and 100%, p <
0:001). Models 2 through 5 restrict the data to observations where the resale market opened,
which allows us to investigate the potential causes of endogenous failure of resale. In model 2,
the basic treatment test, the average probability of agreement between resale treatments is not
signicantly di¤erent once we control for entry into the resale market (coe¢ cient test; p = 0:722).
Empirical Result 4: Di¤erences in the probability of reselling the unit result from di¤erences
in the exogenous rate of resale failure. Once the resale market opens, the probability of resale is
the same across treatments.
Models 3 to 5 examine each treatment individually. The only robust e¤ect across treatments
is the positive e¤ect of the size of the gains from trade, vs   vw, on agreement. In the 30%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agreement W Wins W Wins and Resale Market Opens
30% Resale 50% Resale 100% Resale
50% Resale (50R) 0.268*** 0.0204
(0.0428) (0.0603)
100% Resale (100R) 0.642*** 0.0399
(0.0117) (0.0310)
(First) O¤erw O¤ers -0.00557 -0.00961** -0.0120***
(0.00752) (0.00396) (0.000545)
Auction Price -0.00309* -0.00208 -0.00624*** -0.00383 0.00284
(0.00188) (0.00223) (0.00185) (0.00560) (0.00176)
vs   vw 0.00980*** 0.0138*** 0.0121*** 0.00812*** 0.0150***
(0.00363) (0.00200) (0.00367) (0.00196) (0.00117)
# O¤ers Made -0.0119 -0.0134** -0.00935*
(0.0133) (0.00595) (0.00489)
Period 0.0107*** 0.00151 0.00422 -0.00408** 0.00809
(0.00262) (0.00357) (0.00655) (0.00194) (0.00501)
Value Chat -0.0245 0.0814 0.0666**
(0.231) (0.0531) (0.0284)
Resale Earnings Chat 0.275*** -0.0440 0.0281
(0.0197) (0.0686) (0.0586)
O¤er Chat -0.567*** -0.0116 -0.00666
(0.0275) (0.0137) (0.0383)
Instruction Chat 0.100* -0.0446
(0.0566) (0.0424)
Other Chat 0.236*** 0.00943 0.0579
(0.0761) (0.0263) (0.0941)
Clusters 9 9 3 3 3
Observations 1,300 722 107 215 276
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.8: Marginal e¤ects from probit regressions with agreement in the resale market as the
dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the session level.
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treatment, higher auction prices signicantly decrease the probability of reselling the unit, but
auction price is insignicant in the other resale treatments. Di¤erences in rst o¤ers measure
initial disagreement in the bargaining stage and we nd no e¤ect in the 30% resale treatment,
while in the 50% and 100% resale treatments initial disagreement has a signicant negative
impact on nal agreement. The size of the e¤ect increases with the probability of resale, which
suggests that more certain resale was correlated with more initial disagreement.
To examine the role of chat, we include the 5 major coded categories in the treatment models
to uncover how qualitative di¤erences in the bargaining discussion inuenced the probability of
resale. The types of conversation taking place have the most impact in the 30% treatment, where
the discussion of resale earnings signicantly increased the probability of reselling the unit, and
discussion of the o¤er had a negative impact. The variable Other Chat, which includes discussion
of the auction price, also signicantly improves the probability of resale which is notable since
the 30% treatment was the only treatment where the auction price had a signicant e¤ect.
Table 4.9 presents random e¤ects regressions on the resale price, the other major outcome of
interest in the resale market, with standard errors clustered at the session level. Model 1 presents
the basic model of treatment e¤ects. There is no signicant di¤erence in the nal resale price
between treatments (coe¢ cient test, p = 0:500), but nal resale prices, as one would predict,
are signicantly increasing in the values of the weak and strong bidders.
Empirical Result 5: Final resale prices are not signicantly di¤erent across treatments.
Models 2 to 4 examine each treatment individually, focusing on the e¤ects of the major
categories of chat and examining the role of value statements. Despite the prevalence of false
value statements, they only signicantly a¤ect the resale price in the 100% resale treatment,
where strong types signicantly lower the resale price through false statements of value. Increases
in the number of o¤ers made helps strong types in the 50% resale treatment by signicantly
raising prices, but in the 100% resale treatment the e¤ect is reversed.
We nd two main e¤ects of the major chat categories. In the 30% resale treatment, discussion
of resale earnings signicantly raised the nal resale price, while in the 100% resale treatment
discussion of the o¤er signicantly lowered the resale price.
4.5. E¢ ciency and Revenue
Theoretical predictions on the e¤ects of resale on e¢ ciency and revenue are ambiguous, and
depend on the amount of actual demand reduction and, for nal e¢ ciency, on biddersability
to trade in the resale market.
To provide a visual overview of e¢ ciency, Figure 4.4 plots the relative frequency of a strong
bidder holding both units after the auction and after resale as a function of the bidders value.
The light gray bars represent the auction allocation, while the dark gray bars represent the nal
allocation after resale. Bars at 1 represent an e¢ cient allocation, with the strong bidder holding
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Resale Price 30% Resale 50% Resale 100% Resale
50% Resale (50R) 0.335
(1.817)
100% Resale (100R) 1.371
(1.307)
Auction Price 0.0180 0.146** -0.0540** 0.0553
(0.0227) (0.0575) (0.0258) (0.0537)
vw 0.293*** -0.0585 0.346*** 0.298***
(0.0450) (0.0708) (0.0802) (0.0251)
vs 0.141*** 0.340*** 0.187*** 0.104**
(0.0164) (0.0268) (0.0410) (0.0498)
# O¤ers Made -0.0275 0.241 0.567** -0.487***
(0.141) (0.340) (0.237) (0.188)
Period 0.0211 0.284*** 0.0438 0.0446
(0.0292) (0.0370) (0.0583) (0.103)
Time of Agreement 0.0510* -0.0270** 0.0184
(0.0264) (0.0135) (0.0119)
W Value Statement Lie 1.482 1.739 -1.112
(2.113) (1.223) (0.999)
W Value Statement Truth 0.832 -0.294
(1.824) (0.929)
S Value Statement Lie 0.447 -1.428**
(1.847) (0.671)
S Value Statement Truth 0.753 1.073 1.668
(2.416) (2.474) (2.169)
Resale Earnings Chat 9.299*** 0.893 1.553
(2.657) (1.812) (0.962)
O¤er Chat -5.818 1.043 -0.451***
(3.626) (1.156) (0.134)
Instruction Chat 1.202 -1.107
(2.279) (3.602)
Other Chat -4.567 -2.293 0.959
(6.320) (1.615) (0.772)
Constant 14.69*** 2.919 10.60*** 17.70***
(1.905) (5.202) (2.871) (2.392)
Observations 569 50 105 155
Clusters 9 3 3 3
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.9: Random e¤ects regressions with resale price as the dependent variable. Standard
errors clustered at the session level.
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both units. It is clear that the no resale treatment lead to the highest auction e¢ ciency, and
that higher values led to higher e¢ ciency. In all resale treatments, auction e¢ ciency is much
lower due to demand reduction; even in the 30% resale treatment, despite the low probability
of resale.
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Figure 4.4: Relative frequency of S holding both units after the auction (lighter gray) and after
resale (dark grey) for unit value of S.
In the no resale treatment, the auction allocation represents the nal allocation while in
the resale treatments, the nal allocation may change if the resale market takes place. Given
the probability of resale failure, nal e¢ ciency is only partly higher in the resale treatments.
Notably, despite the low likelihood of resale, in the 30% resale treatment bidders still choose to
reduce demand, thus reducing nal e¢ ciency compared to the no resale treatment.
We formally analyze e¢ ciency and auction prices in Table 4.10, using pooled OLS regressions
with standard errors clustered at the session level. Model 1 examines auction e¢ ciency, dened
as the value of the winner of the second unit divided by the strong bidders value. The negative
signicant coe¢ cients on the three resale treatments supports theoretical result 3, indicating that
resale results in signicantly lower auction e¢ ciency than the no resale treatment. Coe¢ cient
tests on the treatment dummies indicate a weakly signicant di¤erence for auction e¢ ciency
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between the 50% and 100% resale treatments (p = 0:070), but no other signicant di¤erences
(p > 0:348).
(1) (2) (3)
Auction E¢ ciency Final E¢ ciency Auction Price
Random E¢ ciency 0.755*** 0.261**
(0.137) (0.114)
Avg. Value
 
vw+vs
2

0.00528*** 0.00341* 0.701***
(0.00175) (0.00175) (0.0781)
30% Resale -0.133** -0.0708* -3.343
(0.0447) (0.0392) (1.989)
50% Resale -0.144*** -0.00447 -4.315***
(0.0191) (0.0231) (1.246)
100% Resale -0.175*** 0.123*** -5.849***
(0.0248) (0.0205) (1.397)
Constant 0.100 0.530*** -6.402**
(0.0974) (0.110) (2.842)
Clusters 15 15 15
R-squared 0.145 0.087 0.116
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.10: Pooled OLS regressions on outcome variables clustered at session level.
Empirical Result 6: The possibility of resale results in lower auction e¢ ciency, even when
resale is uncertain.
Model 2 uses nal e¢ ciency as the dependent variable, dened as the value of the nal holder
of the second unit divided by the strong bidders value. The positive signicant coe¢ cient on
100% resale indicates that nal e¢ ciency increases when resale is certain. The coe¢ cient for the
50% resale treatment is not signicantly di¤erent from zero, and the coe¢ cient on 30% resale is
weakly signicant and negative. We also nd signicant di¤erences between the resale treatments
(p < 0:001 for coe¢ cient tests between the 30% or 50% and the 100% resale treatments; p = 0:082
between the 30% and 50% resale treatments). Thus, resale only improves the e¢ ciency of the
allocation when the resale market is relatively friction-free.
Empirical Result 7: The possibility of resale improves nal e¢ ciency when resale is certain,
but not necessarily when it is uncertain.
Model 3 considers the auction price which is equivalent to the auctioneers revenue for each
unit sold. Compared to the no resale treatment, resale signicantly lowers revenue in the 50%
and 100% resale treatments, but not in the 30% resale treatment.
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Empirical Result 8: The possibility of resale reduces the sellers revenue when resale is rela-
tively likely.
5. Conclusion
Post-auction resale is commonly justied as a way to improve overall allocative e¢ ciency since
it allows bidders to trade if gains from trade exist. However, this argument is based on the
assumption that a resale will always take place and bidders will be able to agree to a trade. In
reality, it is likely that market frictions and regulations exist which could lead to resale failure.
We use a combination of theory and laboratory experiments to analyze the e¤ects of an
uncertain post-auction resale market in multi-objects auctions with asymmetric bidders. Our
theoretical results demonstrate that even when resale is uncertain, bidders may still engage in
strategic demand reduction and speculation, with the level of strategic behavior depending on
the probability of the resale market. Even with a low probability of resale, however, strategic
behavior continues to emerge, lowering revenue and auction e¢ ciency, which is not likely to be
improved through resale.
Our experimental results suggest that resale does not necessarily increase e¢ ciency  which
conforms to our theoretical results, but stands in contrast to the usual arguments in favor of
resale  nor does it always reduce the sellers revenue. Weak bidders speculate whenever resale
is present and, despite predictions, speculative bids do not decrease when the probability of
resale falls. Strong bidders, on the other hand, do respond to the likelihood of resale reducing
demand signicantly more when resale is more certain. This results in higher revenue when
the likelihood of resale is low, and lower interim e¢ ciency whenever resale may be possible,
regardless of the level of uncertainty.
Once bidders have entered into the resale market, we nd little di¤erence between the rates
of bargaining agreement depending on whether the resale market was more or less likely, so
di¤erences in nal e¢ ciency rates are mostly inuenced by exogenous factors. This suggests
that di¢ culty in nding post-auction trading partners or external regulations that limit resale
are more likely to drive di¤erences in nal outcomes than endogenous issues in the resale market.
These results are relevant for the design of auctions markets because they demonstrate how
features of a post-auction resale market are likely to a¤ect nal e¢ ciency and the auctioneers
revenue. In sum, our experimental results suggest that a relatively low probability of resale in
multi-object auctions may be detrimental for nal e¢ ciency.
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A. Appendix
A.1. 30% and 50% Resale Instructions
Thank you for participating in todays experiment. I will read through a script to explain to
you the nature of todays experiment as well as how to work the computer interface you will
be using. I will be using this script to make sure that all sessions of this experiment receive
the same information, but please feel free to ask questions as they arise. We ask that everyone
please refrain from talking or looking at the monitors of other subjects during the experiment.
If you have a question or problem please raise your hand and one of us will come to you. I also
ask that you please turn o¤ your cell phones.
General information: The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions
in a particular situation. You will receive $10 for showing up on time for the experiment. You
will also make additional money during todays experiment. Upon completion of the experiment
the amount that you make will be paid to you by check. Payments are condential; no other
participant will be told the amount you make. All amounts in this phase of the experiment are
denominated in experimental currency units, ECUs. ECUs will transform into real dollars at
the rate of $0.01 per ECU. These earnings are in addition to the show-up fee.
In this experiment, you will be a bidder in a series of auctions.
Please hit continue for general instructions. Please do not hit continue again until after I
have nished with all instructions for this screen
In this experiment, we will create a market in which you will act as a bidder in a sequence
of auctions. Each auction has two identical units of a hypothetical item for sale. You will be
bidding in the auction against one other person. At the end of each auction there may be the
possibility of the winner reselling the item to the other person. The person you are matched
with to bid against will be randomly chosen at the start of each auction and will therefore be
di¤erent across auctions. Each auction will always have two bidders: a 1-unit bidder and a
2-unit bidder. The 1-unit bidder can purchase only 1 unit of the item and will be assigned a
single value for one (1) unit. The 2-unit bidder can purchase up to 2 units of the item and will
be assigned a single value for each of the two (2) units. For both types of bidders, these values
represent the value of the good to you - what we will pay you for any items purchased.
Please hit continue for information on roles, values, and resale. Again, please do not hit
continue until I have nished with all instructions for this screen
You were randomly assigned a role of 1-unit bidder or 2-unit bidder, which is listed at the
top of your screen. The possible values for the 2-unit bidder are the integers between 30 and 50,
with all values being equally likely, and the possible values for the 1-unit bidder are the integers
between 10 and 30, again all values are equally likely. If you are a 1-unit bidder, you will be
bidding against a 2-unit bidder and vice versa. If the 1-unit bidder purchases a unit, they may
have the opportunity to resell it to the 2-unit bidder. If the 2-unit bidder purchases a unit, they
will not resell it because they have a higher value than the 1-unit bidder.
Please press continue again to work with the auction interface. What you should see is a
at example screen. Please do not hit continue until I have nished with all instructions for this
screen.
30
What you should see in front of you is a sample of the screen you will see for this auction.
The left side of the screen contains boxes that have instructions and payo¤s. On the right side
of the screen you will see the primary auction interface. Beside the word Auctionin the top
line, you will see the number of units you can win (called Units Demanded). Below that you
will see what your value is for a unit in ECUs for this auction (remember your value is what
we will pay you for each unit won). Underneath your value, you will see a bid clock. This clock
shows the current price in the auction and will steadily count up. The clock is not increasing
now, because this is just an example screen. If this were the actual auction, the clock would be
ticking up by 1 ECU per second. Both bidders begin the round inthe auction. As the price
increases on the bid clock, you can click on the Drop Outbutton to drop out of the auction at
any point of your choosing. Note that drop out choices are irreversible so as soon as any bidder
presses the drop out button, the auction will end and the time on the clock will be the auction
price.
After the auction, there may be an opportunity for reselling the object.
Payo¤s: If the 1-unit bidder drops out rst, the 2-unit bidder wins both units in the auction
and there is no resale because the 2-unit bidder has the highest value. In this case, the 2-unit
bidder will earn the di¤erence between their value and the auction price, for each unit. The
1-unit bidder will earn zero.
If the 2-unit bidder drops out rst, the 1-unit bidder wins one unit, and the 2-unit bidder
also wins 1 unit. In this case, each bidder will earn the di¤erence between their value and the
auction price for the unit they won. In addition, because the 2-unit bidder has the highest value,
the 1-unit bidder may have the opportunity to resell the unit they won in the auction to the
2-unit bidder.
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Please press continue to learn more about the resale opportunity
30% Resale
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50% Resale
.
Resale Opportunity: If resale is possible because the 1-unit bidder won 1 unit, both bidders
will enter into the stage you now see on your screen.
On the right side of the screen, you will see an active spin wheel. (wait for spinner to stop
spinning before reading on) The spinner has now stopped. Recall, bidders will only enter this
stage if the 2-unit bidder drops out of the auction rst. In this case the 1-unit bidder and the
2-unit bidder each win 1 unit, and there is the possibility of resale. However, whether or not both
bidders will enter the resale stage also depends on the outcome of a random draw played out by
the spin wheel. Notice that the spin wheel has two colors. If the spinner lands on red, there will
be no resale stage. If the spinner lands on green, there will be a resale stage. Notice also that
the size of the green block is smaller than the red block. The size of these blocks translates into
a 70% (50%) probability that no resale market will occur and a 30% (50%) probability that it
will. The computer will randomly determine where the spinner lands. In this example, you will
see that the spinner has landed on green, which means there will be a resale market.
Please press continue to work with the resale interface.
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Resale: If resale is possible because the 1-unit bidder won 1 unit and the spinner landed on
green in the previous stage, both bidders will enter the resale stage. What you should see in
front of you now is a sample of the screen you will see in the resale stage.
If you were a 1-unit bidder in the auction, you will always be the seller in the resale stage. If
you were a 2-unit bidder in the auction, you will always be the buyer in the resale stage. These
roles are now dened by the bolded sentence at the top left of the screen. If you are the buyer,
you have the opportunity to purchase the 2nd unit from the seller and if you are the seller, you
have the opportunity to sell the unit you won in the auction to the buyer. Immediately below
this, you will see a reminder of your value for the unit and the range of potential values for the
other resale participant you are bargaining with. Your value and the other participants value
remain identical to the values you both had in the auction stage.
Immediately below this, still on the left side of the screen is the resale payo¤ information.
For resale to occur, both the buyer and seller must agree to a resale o¤er. If they agree to a
resale o¤er, the seller will earn the di¤erence between the resale price and their value. The buyer
will earn the di¤erence between their value and the resale price. If no resale o¤er is agreed to,
both the buyer and seller earn 0 in this stage. Any earnings from the resale stage are in addition
to the earnings from the auction.
Resale o¤ers are made at the top right of the screen. To make an o¤er, type in the price
you would like to o¤er into the blue box and click Make O¤er.Once you make this o¤er, it
will immediately appear in the box below under the label, Your O¤er.Any o¤ers made by the
other resale participant to you will also appear in this box on the right hand side.
Please input any o¤er amount into the blue box and press Make O¤er.You should see that
your o¤er box has updated with the o¤er you input. You should also see the other participants
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o¤er to you once they have made their o¤er. Please now input another o¤er and click Make
O¤erto see that your o¤er has changed. To accept the o¤er of the other participant, click on
their o¤er, which will highlight in blue and then click Accept.You can only accept o¤ers made
by the other participant. Currently, the Accept button is disabled because this is an example
screen, but when either the buyer or seller agree to an o¤er by pressing this button, the resale
stage will immediately terminate. Prior to agreement, o¤ers can be changed at anytime.
You have two tools to facilitate your resale decisions. The rst is chat, located at the bottom
right hand side of the screen. Messages can be sent to the other participant in this box. Please
type a message now, for example, hello and press enter. You will see that your message
has popped up and is identiable by the label, YOU.If your practice partner has also sent a
message, that message should have popped-up in the box and is identiable by their role of either
BUYER or SELLER. Make sure that you hit enter after you have typed a message for it to be
sent. We also ask that throughout the experiment you do not provide identiable information
about yourself to the other participant.
In addition to chat, you will also have access to the scrollbar seen on the left side of the
screen. You can use the scrollbar to determine your payo¤ for a given o¤er. The minimum
possible resale o¤er is 10, and the maximum is 50. You can choose any resale price between
these two values by sliding the scrollbar, or clicking on the right and left arrows, which will
increase and decrease the resale price. Please move the scrollbar now.
You should now see that information has appeared below the scrollbar, which will be au-
tomatically updated as you move the scrollbar. The resale o¤er is given directly below the
scrollbar. Below the o¤er, you are given your resale prot for that given o¤er. Directly below
your prot, you are given the probability that the other participants resale prot will be positive
for that particular o¤er.
If you would like to exit resale, there is a button at the bottom left of the screen that you
can click to choose to exit the resale stage at any time. (Emphasize) You will have 180 seconds
(3 minutes) to agree to an o¤er with the other participant. The time will be indicated in the
middle of the right side of the screen, above chat. If an o¤er is not accepted either by you or
the other participant before time expires, no resale will occur.
Please press Exit Resale to continue.
Please follow along with example 1, as we go through a sample auction. Please note that
this example is for explanatory purposes only and is not intended to suggest how you should
make decisions. If you are a 1-unit bidder, your value is 25 and if you are the 2-unit bidder,
your value is 35
In this example, the 1-unit bidder will drop out rst at a price of 20, so the 2-unit bidder
(who doesnt drop out) will win both units in the auction.
We will now play this auction out. When you click continue, you will immediately be taken
into the auction with the live bid clock. On the next screen, the 1-unit bidder should drop out
when the auction price hits 20. The 2-unit bidder should not click the drop out button.
Please click continue to enter the practice auction.
You will now see the bid clock ticking up. The 1-unit bidder should press the drop out
button once the bid clock has reached a price of 20. The 2-unit bidder should not click the drop
out button.
(After 20 seconds and bidder has dropped out.)
If you dropped out at a price other than 20, the computer assumed the drop out price was
20 for example purposes. You should now see that the auction has ended because the drop-out
button disappeared. You will also be told of the auction price.
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Please click continue to be taken to the results summary.
You should now see the results screen for this practice auction. The 2-unit bidder won both
units in the auction because the 1-unit bidder dropped out rst. The 1-unit bidder did not win
a unit. Since the 2-unit bidder won both units and has a higher value, there is no opportunity
for resale.
Earnings for example 1: Notice that the auction price of the item is equal to the drop out
price of 20 made by the 1-unit bidder. The 2-unit bidder won two units. For each unit, the
2-unit bidders earnings are the di¤erence between their value, 35, and the auction price, 20, so
the 2-unit bidder earns 15 for each unit and the total payo¤ for both units won is 30. The 1-unit
bidder earns zero because they did not win a unit.
Please click continue as we will now go through an example where the 2-unit bidder drops
out rst.
Recall, if you are a 1-unit bidder your value for this example is 25 and if you are a 2-unit
bidder your value is 35.
In this example, the 2-unit bidder will drop out rst at a price of 20, so the 1-unit bidder
(who doesnt drop out) will win one unit in the auction and the 2-unit bidder will win the other
unit.
We will now play this auction out. When you click continue, you will be immediately taken
into the auction with the live bid clock. On the next screen, the 2-unit bidder should drop out
when the auction price hits 20. The 1-unit bidder should not click the drop out button.
Please click continue to enter the next practice auction.
Remember, the 2-unit bidder should try to drop out at a price of 20. The 1-unit bidder
should not click the drop out button.
(After 20 seconds and bidder has dropped out)
Again, if the 2-unit bidder dropped out at a price di¤erent from 20, the computer assumed
a drop out of 20 for example purposes. The auction is now over, and since the 2-unit bidder
dropped out rst, the 2-unit bidder won one unit and the 1-unit bidder won one unit. Because
the 2-unit bidder has the highest value, there may be a resale stage where the 1-unit bidder will
have the opportunity to resell the item to the 2-unit bidder. You will now be taken to a screen
which summarizes the auction outcome and plays the random spin wheel to determine if there
will be a resale market in this round.
Please click continue to be taken to this screen
You should now see the screen with the spin wheel. On the left side of the screen you will
see a summary of your earnings in the auction. Both bidders won a unit in the auction and paid
a price equal to the 2-unit bidders drop out price of 20. The 1-unit bidder earned the di¤erence
between their value, 25 and the price 20, for auction prot equal to 5. The 2-unit bidder earned
the di¤erence between their value 35 and the price paid in the auction, 20, for auction prot
equal to 15.
Turning your attention to the spin wheel you will see that the computer generated a spin to
determine if there would be a resale market or not. (stop reading until after spinner stops) You
will notice that the spinner has landed on green and as a result there will be a resale market in
this example. When you hit continue, you will be taken to the resale stage. Had the spinner
landed on red, there would be no resale market and you would have been taken immediately
to the results screen for this round. Your prot for this round would be equal to your auction
prot listed at the top left of the screen.
This bottom left side of this screen will also remind you of your role in resale in the event
that resale occurs. The 1-unit bidder is always the seller in the resale market, while the 2-unit
36
bidder is always the buyer.
Please click continue to be taken to resale stage.
Assume in the resale stage that both resale participants agree to a resale price of 32. To see
how accepting an o¤er works, please input an o¤er of 32 and click Make O¤er.Once the other
participant has input a price of 32, you will see that update as well. To agree to the o¤er made
by the other participant, click on the o¤er given. You will know you have selected the o¤er
once it highlights in blue. During the actual paid resale games, you do not have to both input
the same o¤er for resale agreement; this is only for practice purposes. Please note that either
role can accept and make o¤ers, and it is only necessary for 1 o¤er to be made and accepted
for resale to take place. After selecting the o¤er, click the Accept button. Once an accept
decision is made, resale ends and you should be now taken to the results screen.
You should now see the results screen, which summarizes your auction prot at the top and
your resale prot at the bottom.
The sellers resale prot is 7, which is the di¤erence between the resale price, 32, and their
value, 25. The buyers resale prot is 3, which is the di¤erence between their value, 35, and the
resale price, 32. Total earnings are equal to auction prot plus resale prot.
Last informational points: Note that it is possible to lose money in the auction or in resale.
The 2-unit bidder loses money if they purchase a unit at a price that is higher than their value.
The 1-unit bidder loses money if they purchase a unit in the auction at a price higher than their
value and resale does not occur, or if the resale price is lower than the auction price. You will
all begin this phase of the experiment with a balance of 150 ECUs. This balance will increase
as you make prots and decrease when you make losses. Should you lose enough money that
this balance becomes negative; you will be reset with your initial balance once, and continue
participating. If you go bankrupt a second time, you will be removed from the experiment and
paid your show-up fee only.
Ties: If both bidders dropped out at the exact same time, the computer will randomly select
a winner to break the tie.
Random Groups: You will be randomly re-assigned to a new group each period. There will
always be two people in your group, and the other bidder will be the opposite role.
At some point, because of the software, we may have a group nish before another. This
does not imply any advantage in payments and we ask that you please wait patiently for the
others to nish.
Please press Continue.
We are now about to take a short quiz to ensure you understand the instructions. When
you have nished the quiz, please press continue again to check your answers. If you have an
incorrect answer for one of the questions, the correct answer will be given to you in a pop-
up. Please correct your incorrect answer and hit continue again until all questions have been
answered correctly. Once everyone has completed this quiz, the experiment will continue.
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1 Unit Bidder Quiz - Resale Treatments
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2 Unit Bidder Quiz - Resale Treatments
Are there any questions? We are about to begin the actual auctions that you will be paid
for. Before each auction round, you will see this pause screen which will inform you of your
value for the next round.
You will now begin the paid rounds. You are participating at your own pace. Please follow
the on screen instructions. Please also make sure that when a continue button is available, you
click it whenever you are ready so the experiment can continue.
A.2. 100% Resale Instructions
Thank you for participating in todays experiment. I will read through a script to explain to
you the nature of todays experiment as well as how to work the computer interface you will
be using. I will be using this script to make sure that all sessions of this experiment receive
the same information, but please feel free to ask questions as they arise. We ask that everyone
please refrain from talking or looking at the monitors of other subjects during the experiment.
If you have a question or problem please raise your hand and one of us will come to you. I also
ask that you please turn o¤ your cell phones.
General information: The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions
in a particular situation. You will receive $10 for showing up on time for the experiment. You
will also make additional money during todays experiment. Upon completion of the experiment
the amount that you make will be paid to you by check. Payments are condential; no other
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participant will be told the amount you make. All amounts in this phase of the experiment are
denominated in experimental currency units, ECUs. ECUs will transform into real dollars at
the rate of $0.01 per ECU. These earnings are in addition to the show-up fee.
In this experiment, you will be a bidder in a series of auctions. Please hit continue for general
instructions. Please do not hit continue again until after I have nished with all instructions for
this screen
In this experiment, we will create a market in which you will act as a bidder in a sequence
of auctions. Each auction has two identical units of a hypothetical item for sale. You will be
bidding in the auction against one other person. At the end of each auction there will be the
possibility of the winner reselling the item to the other person. The person you are matched
with to bid against will be randomly chosen at the start of each auction and will therefore be
di¤erent across auctions. Each auction will always have two bidders: a 1-unit bidder and a
2-unit bidder. The 1-unit bidder can purchase only 1 unit of the item and will be assigned a
single value for one (1) unit. The 2-unit bidder can purchase up to 2 units of the item and will
be assigned a single value for each of the two (2) units. For both types of bidders, these values
represent the value of the good to you - what we will pay you for any items purchased.
Please hit continue for information on roles, values, and resale. Again, please do not hit
continue until I have nished with all instructions for this screen
You were randomly assigned a role of 1-unit bidder or 2-unit bidder, which is listed at the
top of your screen. The possible values for the 2-unit bidder are the integers between 30 and 50,
with all values being equally likely, and the possible values for the 1-unit bidder are the integers
between 10 and 30, again all values are equally likely. If you are a 1-unit bidder, you will be
bidding against a 2-unit bidder and vice versa. If the 1-unit bidder purchases a unit, they will
have the opportunity to resell it to the 2-unit bidder. If the 2-unit bidder purchases a unit, they
will not resell it because they have a higher value than the 1-unit bidder.
Please press continue again to work with the auction interface. What you should see is a
at example screen. Please do not hit continue until I have nished with all instructions for this
screen
What you should see in front of you is a sample of the screen you will see for this auction.
The left side of the screen contains boxes that have instructions and payo¤s. On the right side
of the screen you will see the primary auction interface. Beside the word Auctionin the top
line, you will see the number of units you can win (called Units Demanded). Below that you
will see what your value is for a unit in ECUs for this auction (remember your value is what
we will pay you for each unit won). Underneath your value, you will see a bid clock. This clock
shows the current price in the auction and will steadily count up. The clock is not increasing
now, because this is just an example screen. If this were the actual auction, the clock would be
ticking up by 1 ECU per second. Both bidders begin the round inthe auction. As the price
increases on the bid clock, you can click on the Drop Outbutton to drop out of the auction at
any point of your choosing. Note that drop out choices are irreversible so as soon as any bidder
presses the drop out button, the auction will end and the time on the clock will be the auction
price.
After the auction, there may be an opportunity for reselling the object.
Payo¤s: If the 1-unit bidder drops out rst, the 2-unit bidder wins both units in the auction
and there is no resale because the 2-unit bidder has the highest value. In this case, the 2-unit
bidder will earn the di¤erence between their value and the auction price, for each unit. The
1-unit bidder will earn zero.
If the 2-unit bidder drops out rst, the 1-unit bidder wins one unit, and the 2-unit bidder
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also wins 1 unit. In this case, each bidder will earn the di¤erence between their value and the
auction price for the unit they won. In addition, because the 2-unit bidder has the highest value,
the 1-unit bidder will have the opportunity to resell the unit they won in the auction to the
2-unit bidder.
Please press continue again to work with the resale interface.
Resale: If resale is possible because the 1-unit bidder won 1 unit, both bidders automatically
enter the resale stage. What you should see in front of you is a sample of the screen you will
see in resale.
If you were a 1-unit bidder in the auction, you will always be the seller in the resale stage. If
you were a 2-unit bidder in the auction, you will always be the buyer in the resale stage. These
roles are now dened by the bolded sentence at the top left of the screen. If you are the buyer,
you have the opportunity to purchase the 2nd unit from the seller and if you are the seller, you
have the opportunity to sell the unit you won in the auction to the buyer. Immediately below
this, you will see a reminder of your value for the unit and the range of potential values for the
other resale participant you are bargaining with. Your value and the other participants value
remain identical to the values you both had in the auction stage.
Immediately below this, still on the left side of the screen is the resale payo¤ information.
For resale to occur, both the buyer and seller must agree to a resale o¤er. If they agree to a
resale o¤er, the seller will earn the di¤erence between the resale price and their value. The buyer
will earn the di¤erence between their value and the resale price. If no resale o¤er is agreed to,
both the buyer and seller earn 0 in this stage. Any earnings from the resale stage are in addition
to the earnings from the auction.
Resale o¤ers are made at the top right of the screen. To make an o¤er, type in the price
you would like to o¤er into the blue box and click Make O¤er.Once you make this o¤er, it
will immediately appear in the box below under the label, Your O¤er.Any o¤ers made by the
other resale participant to you will also appear in this box on the right hand side.
Please input any o¤er amount into the blue box and press Make O¤er.You should see that
your o¤er box has updated with the o¤er you input. You should also see the other participants
o¤er to you once they have made their o¤er. Please now input another o¤er and click Make
O¤erto see that your o¤er has changed. To accept the o¤er of the other participant, click on
their o¤er, which will highlight in blue and then click Accept.You can only accept o¤ers made
by the other participant. Currently, the Accept button is disabled because this is an example
screen, but when either the buyer or seller agree to an o¤er by pressing this button, the resale
stage will immediately terminate. Prior to agreement, o¤ers can be changed at anytime.
You have two tools to facilitate your resale decisions. The rst is chat, located at the bottom
right hand side of the screen. Messages can be sent to the other participant in this box. Please
type a message now, for example, hello and press enter. You will see that your message
has popped up and is identiable by the label, YOU.If your practice partner has also sent a
message, that message should have popped-up in the box and is identiable by their role of either
BUYER or SELLER. Make sure that you hit enter after you have typed a message for it to be
sent. We also ask that throughout the experiment you do not provide identiable information
about yourself to the other participant.
In addition to chat, you will also have access to the scrollbar seen on the left side of the
screen. You can use the scrollbar to determine your payo¤ for a given o¤er. The minimum
possible resale o¤er is 10, and the maximum is 50. You can choose any resale price between
these two values by sliding the scrollbar, or clicking on the right and left arrows, which will
increase and decrease the resale price. Please move the scrollbar now.
41
You should now see that information has appeared below the scrollbar, which will be au-
tomatically updated as you move the scrollbar. The resale o¤er is given directly below the
scrollbar. Below the o¤er, you are given your resale prot for that given o¤er. Directly below
your prot, you are given the probability that the other participants resale prot will be positive
for that particular o¤er.
If you would like to exit resale, there is a button at the bottom left of the screen that you
can click to choose to exit the resale stage at any time. (Emphasize) You will have 180 seconds
(3 minutes) to agree to an o¤er with the other participant. The time will be indicated in the
middle of the right side of the screen, above chat. If an o¤er is not accepted either by you or
the other participant before time expires, no resale will occur.
Please press Exit Resale to continue.
Please follow along with example 1, as we go through a sample auction. Please note that
this example is for explanatory purposes only and is not intended to suggest how you should
make decisions. If you are a 1-unit bidder, your value is 25 and if you are the 2-unit bidder,
your value is 35
In this example, the 1-unit bidder will drop out rst at a price of 20, so the 2-unit bidder
(who doesnt drop out) will win both units in the auction.
We will now play this auction out. When you click continue, you will immediately be taken
into the auction with the live bid clock. On the next screen, the 1-unit bidder should drop out
when the auction price hits 20. The 2-unit bidder should not click the drop out button.
Please click continue to enter the practice auction.
You will now see the bid clock ticking up. The 1-unit bidder should press the drop out
button once the bid clock has reached a price of 20. The 2-unit bidder should not click the drop
out button.
(After 20 seconds and bidder has dropped out.)
If you dropped out at a price other than 20, the computer assumed the drop out price was
20 for example purposes. You should now see that the auction has ended because the drop-out
button disappeared. You will also be told of the auction price.
Please click continue to be taken to the results summary.
You should now see the results screen for this practice auction. The 2-unit bidder won both
units in the auction because the 1-unit bidder dropped out rst. The 1-unit bidder did not win
a unit. Since the 2-unit bidder won both units and has a higher value, there is no resale.
Earnings for example 1: Notice that the auction price of the item is equal to the drop out
price of 20 made by the 1-unit bidder. The 2-unit bidder won two units. For each unit, the
2-unit bidders earnings are the di¤erence between their value, 35, and the auction price, 20, so
the 2-unit bidder earns 15 for each unit and the total payo¤ for both units won is 30. The 1-unit
bidder earns zero because they did not win a unit.
Please click continue as we will now go through an example where the 2-unit bidder drops
out rst.
EXAMPLE 2
Recall, if you are a 1-unit bidder your value for this example is 25 and if you are a 2-unit
bidder your value is 35.
In this example, the 2-unit bidder will drop out rst at a price of 20, so the 1-unit bidder
(who doesnt drop out) will win one unit in the auction and the 2-unit bidder will win the other
unit.
We will now play this auction out. When you click continue, you will be immediately taken
into the auction with the live bid clock. On the next screen, the 2-unit bidder should drop out
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when the auction price hits 20. The 1-unit bidder should not click the drop out button.
Please click continue to enter the next practice auction.
Remember, the 2 unit bidder should try to drop out at a price of 20. The 1-unit bidder
should not click the drop out button.
(After 20 seconds and bidder has dropped out)
Again, if the 2-unit bidder dropped out at a price di¤erent from 20, the computer assumed
a drop out of 20 for example purposes. The auction is now over, and since the 2-unit bidder
dropped out rst, the 2-unit bidder won one unit and the 1-unit bidder won one unit. Because
the 2-unit bidder has the highest value, there will be a resale stage where the 1-unit bidder will
have the opportunity to resell the item to the 2-unit bidder, but rst you will be taken to an
auction summary screen.
Please click continue to be taken to the pre-resale auction results summary.
Both bidders won a unit in the auction and paid a price equal to the 2-unit bidders drop
out price of 20. The 1-unit bidder earned the di¤erence between their value, 25 and the price
20, for auction prot equal to 5. The 2-unit bidder earned the di¤erence between their value 35
and the price paid in the auction, 20, for auction prot equal to 15.
This pre-resale results screen will also remind you of your role in resale. The 1-unit bidder
is always the seller in the resale market, while the 2-unit bidder is always the buyer.
Please click continue to be taken to resale stage.
Assume in the resale stage that both resale participants agree to a resale price of 32. To see
how accepting an o¤er works, please input an o¤er of 32 and click Make O¤er.Once the other
participant has input a price of 32, you will see that update as well. To agree to the o¤er made
by the other participant, click on the o¤er given. You will know you have selected the o¤er
once it highlights in blue. During the actual paid resale games, you do not have to both input
the same o¤er for resale agreement; this is only for practice purposes. Please note that either
role can accept and make o¤ers, and it is only necessary for 1 o¤er to be made and accepted
for resale to take place. After selecting the o¤er, click the Accept button. Once an accept
decision is made, resale ends and you should be now taken to the results screen.
You should now see the results screen which summarizes your auction prot at the top and
your resale prot at the bottom.
The sellers resale prot is 7, which is the di¤erence between the resale price, 32, and their
value, 25. The buyers resale prot is 3, which is the di¤erence between their value, 35, and the
resale price, 32. Total earnings are equal to auction prot plus resale prot.
Last informational points: Note that it is possible to lose money in the auction or in resale.
The 2-unit bidder loses money if they purchase a unit at a price that is higher than their value.
The 1-unit bidder loses money if they purchase a unit in the auction but the resale price is
lower than the auction price. You will all begin this phase of the experiment with a balance of
150 ECUs. This balance will increase as you make prots and decrease when you make losses.
Should you lose enough money that this balance becomes negative; you will be reset with your
initial balance once, and continue participating. If you go bankrupt a second time, you will be
removed from the experiment and paid your show-up fee only.
Ties: If both bidders dropped out at the exact same time, the computer will randomly select
a winner to break the tie.
Random Groups: You will be randomly re-assigned to a new group each period. There will
always be two people in your group, and the other bidder will be the opposite role.
At some point, because of the software, we may have a group nish before another. This
does not imply any advantage in payments and we ask that you please wait patiently for the
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others to nish.
Please press Continue.
We are now about to take a short quiz to ensure you understand the instructions. When
you have nished the quiz, please press continue again to check your answers. If you have an
incorrect answer for one of the questions, the correct answer will be given to you in a pop-
up. Please correct your incorrect answer and hit continue again until all questions have been
answered correctly. Once everyone has completed this quiz, the experiment will continue. (Same
quiz as previous instructions)
Are there any questions? We are about to begin the actual auctions that you will be paid
for. Before each auction round, you will see this pause screen which will inform you of your
value for the next round.
A.3. No Resale
Thank you for participating in todays experiment. I will read through a script to explain to
you the nature of todays experiment as well as how to work the computer interface you will be
using. I will be using this script to make sure that all sessions of this experiment receive the
same information, but please feel free to ask questions as they arise. We ask that everyone please
refrain from talking or looking at the monitors of other subjects during the experiment. If you
have a question or problem please raise your hand and one of us will come to you. I also ask
that you please turn o¤ your cell phones. Please wait until instructed to click the Continue
button.
General information: The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions
in a particular situation. You will receive $10 for showing up on time for the experiment. In
addition, you will make money during todays experiment. Upon completion of the experiment
the amount that you make will be paid to you by check. Payments are condential; no other
participant will be told the amount you make. All amounts in this phase of the experiment are
denominated in experimental currency units, ECUs. ECUs will transform into real dollars at
the rate of $0.01 per ECU. These earnings are in addition to the $10 show-up fee.
Details of phase 1 (Auction): In this experiment, you will be a bidder in a series of auctions.
Please hit continue for general instructions. Please do not hit continue again until after I
have nished with all instructions for this screen
In this experiment, we will create a market in which you will act as a bidder in a sequence
of auctions. Each auction has two identical units of a hypothetical item for sale. You will
be bidding in the auction against one other person. The person you are matched with to bid
against will be randomly chosen at the start of each auction and will therefore be di¤erent across
auctions. Each auction will always have two bidders: a 1-unit bidder and a 2-unit bidder. The
1-unit bidder can purchase only 1 unit of the item and will be assigned a single value for one
(1) unit. The 2-unit bidder can purchase up to 2 units of the item and will be assigned a single
value for each of the two (2) units. For both types of bidders, these values represent the value
of the good to you - what we will pay you for any items purchased.
Please hit continue for information on roles and values. Again, please do not hit continue
until I have nished with all instructions for this screen
You were randomly assigned a role, which is listed at the top of your screen. You are either
a 1-unit bidder or a 2-unit bidder. The possible values for the 2-unit bidder are the integers
between 30 and 50, with all values being equally likely, and the possible values for the 1-unit
bidder are the integers between 10 and 30, again all values are equally likely. If you are a 1-unit
bidder, you will be bidding against a 2-unit bidder and vice versa.
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Please press continue again to work with the auction interface. What you should see is a
at example screen. Please do not hit continue until I have nished with all instructions for this
screen
What you should see in front of you is a sample of the screen you will see for this auction.
The left side of the screen contains boxes that have instructions and auction payo¤s. On the
right side of the screen you will see the primary auction interface. Beside the word Auction
in the top line, you will see the number of units you can win (called Units Demanded). Below
that you will see what your value is for a unit in ECUs for this auction (remember your value
is what we will pay you for each unit won). Underneath your value, you will see a bid clock.
This clock shows the current price in the auction and will steadily count up. The clock is not
increasing now, because this is just an example screen. If this were the actual auction, the clock
would be ticking up by 1 ECU per second. Both bidders begin the round inthe auction. As
the price increases on the bid clock, you can click on the Drop Outbutton to drop out of the
auction at any point of your choosing. Note that drop out choices are irreversible so as soon as
you press the drop out button, you will exit the auction and the time on the clock is auction
price. The auction will end as soon as one bidder has dropped out. After the auction concludes,
you will be taken to another screen which will inform you of the auction results.
Earnings: After the auction, your earnings will be determined by how many units you won,
which depends on whether or not you dropped out rst.
If the 1-unit bidder drops out rst, the 2-unit bidder wins both units and the 1-unit bidder
does not win a unit. If the 2-unit bidder drops out rst, the 1-unit bidder wins one unit, and
the 2-unit bidder also wins 1 unit.
Your payo¤ for each unit won is the di¤erence between your value and the auction price. If
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you do not win a unit, your earnings will be zero.
Note that it is possible to lose money in this auction if the price resulting from the auction
is more than your value. You will all begin this phase of the experiment with a balance of
150 ECUs. This balance will increase as you make prots and decrease when you make losses.
Should you lose enough money that this balance becomes negative; you will be reset with your
initial balance once, and continue participating. If you go bankrupt a second time, you will be
removed from the experiment and paid your show-up fee only. Two-time bankrupt bidders will
be replaced with robot bidders.
Ties: If both bidders dropped out at the exact same time, the computer will randomly select
a winner to break the tie.
Random Groups: You will be randomly re-assigned to a new group each period. There will
always be two people in your group, and the other bidder will be the opposite role.
At some point, because of the software, we may have a group nish before another. This
does not imply any advantage in payments and we ask that you please wait patiently for the
others to nish.
Please click continue to go through an example outcome.
EXAMPLE 1
In this example, if you are a 1 unit bidder, your role is the same as Bidder 1. If you are a
2-unit bidder, your role is the same as Bidder 2.
The following table contains a set of sample values and a drop out price that could occur in
an auction round. Row 1 shows you the values each bidder has. The second row in the table
lists the number of units each type of bidder can purchase. The third row lists the drop out
price. Notice that Bidder 1 dropped out rst at a price of 20, so Bidder 2 (who didnt drop out)
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wins both units in the auction. The fourth row indicates the number of units each bidder won
the auction. Bidder 2 won two units in the auction and Bidder 1 did not win a unit. Notice that
the auction price of the item is equal to the drop out price made by Bidder 1. You can see this
in row 5. The last row indicates the prot each bidder would have made. Bidder 1 would earn
zero because he did not win a unit. Bidder 2 won two units. For each unit, Bidder 2s earnings
are the di¤erence between his value, 35, and the price paid in the auction, 20, so he earns 15 for
each unit and his total payo¤ for both units is equal to 30.
Please note that these examples are for explanatory purposes only and are not intended to
be suggested bids.
Please click continue as we will now go through an example outcome where Bidder 2 drops
out rst.
EXAMPLE 2
Assume this time that Bidder 2 drops out rst at a price of 20, instead of Bidder 1. Because
Bidder 2 dropped out rst, Bidder 1 won 1 unit in the auction. Bidder 1 purchases one unit at
the drop out price of Bidder 2, which is 20. Bidder 1s earnings are the di¤erence between his
value, 25, and the price paid in the auction, 20. So his total payo¤ is equal to 5. Because Bidder
1 can only purchase 1 unit, Bidder 2 won the remaining unit at the price he dropped out at, 20.
Bidder 2s earnings are the di¤erence between his value, 35, and the price paid in the auction,
20. So his total payo¤ is equal to 15.
Please press Continue.
We are now about to take a short quiz to ensure you understand the instructions. When
you have nished the quiz, please press continue again to check your answers. If you have an
incorrect answer for one of the questions, the correct answer will be given to you in a pop-
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up. Please correct your incorrect answer and hit continue again until all questions have been
answered correctly. Once everyone has completed this quiz, the experiment will continue.
1 Unit Bidder Quiz - No Resale Treatment
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2 Unit Bidder Quiz - No Resale Treatment
To familiarize yourself with the computer interface, you will now begin a practice round
against a robot bidder. You will not be paid for this round. Please press Continue to enter
into a practice auction with the robot bidder. Remember, to drop out of the auction, click the
drop outbutton. When the auction has ended a continue button will appear at the bottom
of the screen. When the auction has ended, either because you dropped out rst, or the robot
bidder dropped out rst, please hit this continue button to move onto the practice round results.
(After practice)
Are there any questions? We are about to begin the actual auctions that you will be paid
for. Please click the Continuebutton to begin the paid rounds. You are now participating at
your own pace. Please follow the on screen instructions- Please make sure that when a continue
button is available, you click it whenever you are ready so the experiment can continue.
Are there any questions? We are about to begin the actual auctions that you will be paid
for. Before each auction round, you will see this pause screen which will inform you of your
value for the next round.
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